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Houston, We've Had a Problem 
Lewis Goodings & Paul Dickerson
Abstract: It is 50 years since the Apollo 13 mission failed to reach the surface of the moon. In this 
article we examine the audio recording of the post-mission press conference from the Apollo 13 
spaceflight. We will focus on the "problem" (an explosion on-board the spacecraft) that prevented 
the astronauts (Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert and Fred Haise) from reaching the moon and we will 
analyse how their retrospective talk organises "what happened" and "what we did" in their 
recollections of the events surrounding the explosion. In the analysis we identify how these 
accounts are discursively organised in such a way that the explosion is positioned as an external 
event that was unavoidable and unexpected. Furthermore, the astronaut's responses to witnessing 
this unexpected event and their subsequent actions on realising the severity of the event are 
constructed as being measured, rational and logical. 
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1. Introduction
02 07 53 12 CMP (Jack Swigert) Okay. Stand by.
02 07 55 19 LMP (Fred Haise) Okay, Houston - -
02 07 55 20 CMP (Jack Swigert) I believe we've had a problem here.
02 07 55 28 CC (CAPCOM) This is Houston. Say again, please.
02 07 55 35 CDR (Jim Lovell) Houston, we've had a problem. We've had a
MAIN BUS B UNDERVOLT
02 07 55 42 CC (CAPCOM) Roger. MAIN B UNDERVOLT
02 07 55 58 CC (CAPCOM) Okay, stand by, 13. We're looking at it. 
Table 1: Official transcript of the Apollo 13 Technical air-to-ground voice transcription, 
Apollo Space Program Office, NASA, April 1970. [1]
The above table shows the official transmission between the Apollo spacecraft 
and the mission control space centre in Houston during the Apollo 13 spaceflight. 
It is a recording of the highly publicised moment where the crew state "Houston, 
we've had a problem". All three astronauts are included in this communication: 
Fred Haise first alerts Houston to there being an issue ("Okay, Houston"), Jack 
Swigert then alludes to the possibility of a problem ("I believe we've had a 
problem here") and Jim Lovell confirms the situation ("Houston, we've had a 
problem"). Whilst this one utterance has become exceptionally well known, 
examining it in context indicates something of the subtleties of the collective 
process of this communication. This brief extract alone is also suggestive of 
issues such as "who gets to do the telling" (captain Jim Lovell repeats the 
announcement that command module pilot Jack Swigert made) and "what details  
are given" (Jim Lovell's announcement of "a problem" is followed by a more 
detailed technical specification). In this article, we investigate some of the issues 
that are involved in the organisation of "factual discourse" of unexpected events, 
by examining the press conference that the three astronauts gave following their 
safe return to earth. [2]
We begin by describing the Apollo 13 mission details and the circumstances 
surrounding the explosion (Section 2). Then, we introduce the sample of 
astronaut talk examined in this study (Section 3). In the analysis (Section 4), we 
highlight the ways that the astronauts account for their actions out in space and 
consider the factual construction of their accounts. Finally, we offer some 
reflections on the discursive features of this talk and consider further 
opportunities to analyse talk surrounding unexpected events of this kind (Section 
5). [3]
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2. Apollo 13
2.1 The mission
Apollo 13 launched on 11th April 1970 without any major issues and the crew of 
the Apollo flight left the earth's atmosphere on a trajectory towards the moon. 
However, the mission had to be aborted after 56 hours when there was an 
explosion in one of the oxygen tanks in the service module. The explosion caused 
substantial damage and eradicated any possibility of landing on the moon, 
producing a situation where the astronauts would have to preserve enough 
"consumables" (primarily fuel and oxygen) in order to survive the journey back to 
earth. The explosion was accompanied with a loud bang, which was audible to 
the crew members on board. The implications of the bang were not immediately 
apparent from the instrumentation on the spacecraft and it was only when one of 
the astronauts (Jim Lovell) noticed considerable "venting" coming out of the side 
of the spacecraft that the full scale of the occurrence became apparent. Once the 
astronauts (and mission control) realised that they were not going to make it to 
the moon NASA decided to "sling-shot" the spacecraft around the moon using the 
moon's gravitational pull as a form of propulsion, combined with a number of well-
timed "burns" (which were used to correct the spacecraft's return trajectory) in 
order to leave the crew with sufficient fuel to get home. On returning to earth, the 
explosion was identified as being caused by an electrical failure triggered during 
the routine process of stirring the oxygen tanks. In this article, we explore the way 
that the three astronauts recount their experiences of these events at the post-
mission conference that took place on April 24th 1970. We examine the way that 
they construct their experiences of where they were and what they were doing in 
the moments leading up to hearing the unexpected explosion and how they 
responded to this event as they became aware of its severity. [4]
In this article we purposefully diverge from social cognitive approaches in 
psychology that often employ attributional theories to explain reactions to 
unexpected events. Research in attribution has focused on how people try to 
locate the "causes" of events (HEIDER, 1958). For example, we could draw on 
KELLEY's (1971) covariation model to identify what factors "co-vary" with the 
event to be explained i.e., we would attribute a casual explanation to either a 
"situational" (external) or "dispositional" (internal) explanation. Alternatively, we 
might consider how the astronauts' attributions reflects a self-serving bias, which 
might be especially salient given the environment in which someone might 
potentially be held to account for the explosion (CAMPBELL & SEDIKIDES, 
1999). Though different in many important respects, these attribution approaches 
share a common focus on the cognitive activity of the individual trying to make 
sense of the event. That is, the common interest here is what does the individual 
person trying to make sense of the event (by locating its cause) do cognitively. As 
argued below, this approach has been directly challenged by discursive 
psychology (EDWARDS, 2005; EDWARDS & POTTER, 1992; ROBINSON, 
2017), which places cognitive activity in parenthesis and focuses instead on the 
manifest talk of those involved. [5]
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2.2 Examining factual discourse
Discursive psychology offers an analytic gaze, or framework, that has been 
brought to bear on a vast range of different talk data, although the emphasis on 
examining "what the talk is doing" has led some to question the utility of 
examining researcher generated data such as "traditional" researcher interviews 
with participants (POTTER & HEPBURN, 2005). From a discursive perspective, 
spoken accounts build on a collectively shared set of linguistic resources and 
typically include some form of social action or accomplishment (EDWARDS & 
POTTER, 1993). Constructions of an event are far from being simply concerned 
with the transmission of information and can instead be examined in terms of a 
wide range of potential interactional concerns to which they may orientate. This 
could include the accountability, which—in the very act of description—addresses 
issues such as who is to be held accountable for what has happened 
(EDWARDS & POTTER, 1992). It could also include the ways in which speakers 
attend to the veracity of their talk and specifically their own and each other's 
epistemological authority. This is particularly relevant in cases where the talk not 
only involves factual discourse of past events, but, more specifically, factual 
discourse concerning an unexpected event. WOOFFITT (1992, 2006) provides a 
sustained analysis of the way in which unexpected events (typically in terms of 
paranormal experiences) are constructed, noting that people reporting 
paranormal activity will often comment on the ordinary nature of events prior to 
the paranormal experience. WOOFFITT (1992, p.105) refers to this prefacing 
activity as "I was just X when Y" whereby the description of the paranormal 
experience (Y) is prefaced with an account of the mundane activities (X). In the 
following example, we can see "S" (anonymised name of the participant) using an 
example of the "X when Y" device. In this extract the numbers in brackets relate 
to the length of a pause between two words and where pause that are too short 
to be measured (typically less than 0.2 seconds) are represented as "(.)". 
"S: an' I went in there (.) er:m w- with my mother in law and uhm: (.4) friends that 
were with me (1.3) hhh (.) and I was just looking at the coffin and there was David 
standing there (.3) he was in Blues (1) hh he wasn't wearing his hat his hat was on 
the coffin and he was there" (WOOFFITT, 1992, pp.123-124). [6]
The contrast between the usual X ("I was just looking at the coffin") and the 
unusual Y ("and there was David standing there") constructs the unexpected 
intrusion into the speaker's world as something that could not be avoided and 
where the contrast between X and Y serves to illustrate the unforeseen nature of 
the incident. Due to the ordinary aspects of X and the subsequent unexpected 
occurrence of Y, this way of constructing past events gives weight to the 
extraordinary qualities of an event and to the speaker's ability to recognise the 
unusual context in which the event has occurred. Furthermore, this device 
situates the unexpected event as not of the speakers' own making. WOOFFITT's 
analysis illustrates the way that talk about paranormal experiences can orientate 
to issues of potential audience scepticism by using the "I was just doing X when 
Y" device. The specification of the activity and context prior to the paranormal 
occurrence and the construction of these in mundane terms can be seen as 
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accomplishing an unmotivated encounter with the paranormal. This shows how 
the paranormal encounter intruded into the normal course of everyday activities—
rather than being in any sense "looked for", "expected" or "consistent" with the 
unusual nature of the prior context and activities of the speaker (see also CHILDS 
& MURRAY, 2010). [7]
The discursive use of "script formulations", similar to the "X when Y" device, have 
been found to be present at the site of organising factual discourse (EDWARDS, 
1995). Script formulations are explanations of an event that have a predictable 
sequential pattern and that speak to a sense of normative order. Through the use 
of script formulations people speak about the factual status of an event so that 
later actions do not require further evidence of their existence (SNEIJDER & TE 
MOLDER, 2005). Therefore, the use of script formation can accomplish 
interactional work such as exoneration, blame, affiliation and establishing 
epistemic authority (RIAZ, BUCHANAN & RUEBOTTOM, 2016). From this 
perspective, the retrospective constructions that the astronauts provide of the 
explosion on the Apollo 13 spacecraft becomes a rich terrain for investigating the 
ways in which factual statements are handled in the constructions of past events. [8]
3. The Data 
The Apollo 13 post-mission conference was publicly released in 2010 as part of 
the 40th anniversary of the mission. The data is stored on a DVD and is available 
with the official NASA publication of the Apollo 13 mission (GOODWIN, 2010). 
The conference recording is 75 minutes long and the following analysis focuses 
on the first 12 minutes of the conference (as this is when the astronauts discuss 
hearing the explosion). The conference takes place in a large theatre and each of 
the astronauts is seated at a desk on the stage. They are initially introduced by a 
NASA representative and then Jim Lovell leads the direction of the conference. 
All speech has been transcribed using a modified version of the JEFFERSON 
(2004) transcription system (see the Appendix). Analysing the talk from the post-
mission conference is comparable with a wealth of research in discursive 
psychology that examines publically available talk such as political speeches and 
public debates. [9]
We analysed the post-mission conference using discourse analysis. Initial stages 
of the analysis coded the transcript for evidence where the talk was achieving an 
interactional accomplishment. These codes were then collected into themes. 
Each theme was designed to capture the sense of the codes and of the social 
actions that are being constructed. Discourse analysis focusses on the 
performative functions of talk and is keen to identify what people are trying to do 
with their talk (EDWARDS & POTTER, 1993; KOROBOV, 2018; POTTER & 
WETHERELL, 1987; TUCKER, 2009). The analysis focussed on how the 
astronauts constructed their collective experiences of the explosion and their 
responses to it. What is important here is not the factual accuracy of what each 
astronaut said and whether this relates to the actions on board Apollo 13, but the 
subtle discursive actions embedded in the way the event is described and 
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communicated. The first extract is taken from Jim's version of the events, and the 
other astronauts' comments follow. [10]
4. Analysis
4.1 Constructing location on the spacecraft 
Jim: I guess the show lasted >for about a< half an hour (1.0) and- (.) just-(.) after we 
had turned off the came↓ra (1.2) >Fred was still in the lunar module< (.) Jack was- 
back in the command module in the left-hand seat (.) and I was- (.) half-way in 
between in the lower equipment bay wrestling with TV wires and a camera and 
watching (.) Fred coming on down (.) when all the three of us heard (.) a rather large 
bang (.) °just-° just ↓one bang (0.6) now↑ before that (.) Fred being in the lunar 
module had actuated a valve which nominally gives us that same (.) sound (.) and 
since he didn't tell us about it we all rather jumped up and we >°all sorta worried 
about it°< (.) but (.) it was his joke and ((cough)) we all thought it was a lot of fun at 
the time since nothing happened (.) so when this bang came (.) we really didn't (.) e:r 
get con↑cerned right away but then I looked up at Fred (.) and Fred had that 
expression like (.) it wasn't his fault 
Audience: ((laughter))
Jim: and (.) er we suddenly (.) realised that something else occurred but- exactly 
what we didn't kn↓ow (1.7)> I'd like to go on now< and let Fred and J↑↓a::ck explain 
what their impressions were at this very same instance that I heard the explosion in 
the lower equipment bay (.) jack?
Extract 1. Jim 06:25 [11]
Extract 1 shows Jim accounting for each of their positions on the spacecraft. Jim 
uses a 3-part list (JEFFERSON, 1991) to describe each of their locations on the 
shuttle and uses a brief pause to separate each location/astronaut: "Fred was still 
in the lunar module (.) Jack was back in the command module in the left-hand 
seat (.) and I was half-way in between in the lower equipment bay". The use of 
this list acts to construct Jim as an authority on how this event is to be 
remembered, and in using the specifics of where each crew member was, Jim is 
able to segment the spacecraft in terms of the different mission-related locations. 
Thus we do not get an absence of specification, nor a (seemingly) redundant 
specification ("we were all aboard the spacecraft"). Furthermore, independent of 
the level of specificity, there is a choice of descriptor for Jack and Fred's location 
in terms of the role segmentation of the Apollo mission—not "front" or "back", 
some sort of temporally structured distinction "where we all were initially", or in 
terms of usage "where we did the broadcast" or "ate our freeze dried meals" but 
instead "lunar module" and "command module". These specifications further 
underscore the ability to form a script for how the event is to be collectively 
recognised. As a result, their actions are hearable in terms of their roles on the 
spacecraft. [12]
Having constructed the location of each crew member, Jim goes on to describe 
the details of what happened on hearing the bang. Jim states that "when all the 
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three of us heard (.) all the three of us heard a rather large bang". This statement 
shows the importance of the bang as a collective experience and is similar to the 
way speakers often describe the mundane features of the actions at the point at 
which something extraordinary occurs (WOOFFITT, 1992). Extract 1 also seems 
to contain some elements of this discursive device in the way that Jim takes 
some care to describe the location and the mundane activities of each of the 
three astronauts leading up to the bang. The descriptions then form the mundane 
X-type activities and the bang is situated as the unexpected quantity Y. 
Therefore, the bang is discursively amplified as being something unpredictable 
and subsequently outside of the astronauts' control. [13]
However, the current data offers a slight difference to the "X when Y" device. In 
this data, there is less likelihood of a sceptical reading of the unusual event "the 
bang" being described—but there is still a construction of prior context and 
activities. In the current example each astronaut is described in terms of being, or 
having been at a place in the spacecraft specified in terms of and consistent with 
their mission role and where their activity was detailed it was consistent with their 
role ("Fred was still in the lunar module ..." etc.). What seems to be at work here 
is that the specification of X attends to accountability that locates each astronaut 
in an appropriate place and as implicitly involved in some activity consistent with 
that place or role. Prior to describing the bang, then, the specification of 
antecedent locations and activities provides some sense of each being 
accountably doing what they should be doing. The unusual and destructive event 
is thus implicitly positioned as an intrusion into, rather than in any sense arising 
out of, their prior activity. [14]
In addition to specifying the prior context to the core phenomenon of the bang—
we find that each of the astronauts constructs an initial interpretation (that was 
less catastrophic and typically minimising) prior to a subsequent realisation of the 
threatening nature of the event. Thus Jim refers to the prior actions by Fred that 
had given rise to a false alarm and how he and Jack interpreted the target bang 
being described as another case of Fred's "joke". As Jim states: "now before that 
Fred being in the lunar module had actuated a valve which nominally gives us 
that same (.) sound (.) and since he didn't tell us about it we all rather jumped up 
and we °all sorta worried about it° but it was his joke". The emphasis here is that 
the interpretation was rational and measured, rather than reflecting any sort of 
nervous over-reaction ("we really didn't get concerned right away"). However, this 
assessment of the situation changes as Jim describes looking to Fred and where 
"Fred had that expression like it wasn't his fault". This replaces the initial minimal 
consequences interpretation with a more serious realisation. Jim then states that 
"we suddenly realised that something else occurred but exactly what we didn't 
know". This subsequent realisation is constructed as a measured response where 
there was awareness of not knowing instead of a process of jumping to 
catastrophic conclusions. The astronauts recognised there was a problem and 
carefully considered what that might be. [15]
Throughout this narrative, Jim is orientating to a joint construction of this position 
through the repeated use of the pronoun "we" (i.e., "we suddenly realised that 
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something else occurred but exactly what we didn't know"). Joint remembering 
functions to sequentially co-opt others into taking a position on what should or 
should not be happening (MIDDLETON, 1997; MIDDLETON & BROWN, 2005; 
WERTSCH, 2002). Therefore, Jim is positioning the memory of the event as a 
collective practice, as something "we" experienced, and as such it acts to co-opt 
the other crew members into reconstructing the memory of the event in a similar 
way. In the final section of Extract 1, Jim offers the other crew members the 
opportunity to give their comments on what they thought and felt in terms of the 
bang ("I'd like to go on now< and let Fred and J↑↓a::ck explain what their 
impressions were at this very same instance that I heard the explosion in the 
lower equipment bay (.) jack?"). What is particularly noteworthy is that this 
opportunity is not set up as an opportunity for clarification or explanation for what 
Jim has just discussed, but rather as an opportunity for each of the crew 
members to give their subjective views on what happened. This is clearly built on 
an understanding that shared accounts provide a pervasive, factual status to the 
accounts. However, the accounts are not fully allowed to adopt their collective 
status as the astronauts are only given permission to speak one at a time. Given 
this distinction, the descriptions of the event still seem to maintain their collective 
ability to co-constitute their actions and even with the slightly unnatural 
organisation of the interaction there is a performance of their intersubjectivity. 
The following extract is taken from Jack's version of the event: [16]
4.2 Signs of warning 
Jack:°ok° ((clears throat)) °s'cuse me° (1.2) e::r (.) the sensation I had (.) er that I had 
felt a vibration accompanying (.) the bang (.) er (.) not a large vibration °> or 
shudder<° (.) er (.) I er proceeded to e::r look at er Jim and e::r (.) and er about the 
same time which (.) I guess about two seconds had elapsed when I had master alarm 
and er a main bus b under volt light (.) er I transmitted to Houston that we had a 
problem and proceeded to (.) over on the right hand side of the space craft to look at 
the voltage (.) er (.) the voltage at that moment was completely normal (.) the current 
was not high (.) and the fuel cell flows where normal which indicated to me that .hh 
whatever it was it was some sort of a transient that e::r that didn't exist at that ↓time 
(.) e::r (.) it (.) me being a command module pilot and e:r and the source the er (.) of 
the bang (.) e::r not immediately determinable er it was my thought that uh (.) of 
course I had a little more confidence in the command module so I thought it occurred 
in the LM so I said let's get the hatch in here and er and e::r so we can sit back and 
think about it and we had the tunnel open at this time and I thought we might be 
vulnerable to losing pressure .hh (.) so I proceeded to get the hatch in (.) e::::r (.) 
begin installing the hatch and at that time Fred went back over to the e::r lunar 
module pilot couch and I'll let him tell what uh his observations where (.) as far the 
instruments and the other caution warning alarms 
Extract 2. Jack 07:45 [17]
Extract 2 shows Jack's comments on his experience of the bang. Jack uses a 
high amount of technical language (e.g., "a main bus b undervolt light") that 
matches Jim's earlier comments. Where Jack realises they are in serious trouble, 
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he explains his movements as: "I er proceeded to e::r look at er Jim". Where 
many people might be permitted the opportunity to shout, scream, swear or panic 
at a moment like this, Jack describes how he simply proceeded to "look at Jim". 
This marks the unwavering connection between Jack and his captain and shows 
discursive evidence of a script formulation (EDWARDS, 1995) in that, for Jack, 
looking a Jim is scripted to imply some following action or intention (in that they 
were in trouble and that they needed to do something). It also acts to construct 
the joint moral character of the two astronauts and speaks to their competencies 
on board the spacecraft. Following this, Jack communicates the factual status of 
the event: "I transmitted to Houston that we had a problem". [18]
Jack describes how even though they had heard a bang that many of the 
instruments did not show any immediate signs of warning. Jack states that at the 
time of the bang: "the voltage at that moment was completely normal and the 
current was not high". The emphasis on the phrase "not high" extenuates the 
astronaut's credibility due to the way that they knew something was wrong even 
though the instrumentation suggested otherwise. Jack states that the bang was 
"some sort of a transient" and that it "didn't exist at that time". Therefore, Jack 
could get no confirmation or further information on the nature of the bang from 
the instrumentation at his disposal. In this section of the talk the astronauts and 
the spacecraft and constructed as one. It implies that they could feel that 
something was wrong but they were yet to find out what the problem was. Here 
the past actions are recounted in a way that privileges the role of the speaker and 
positions them as able to anticipate changes in the spacecraft. [19]
On feeling the bang, Jack comments on how he responded in terms of his 
command module pilot status: "being a command module pilot and uh the source 
er of the bang ... so I thought it occurred in the LM so I said let's get the hatch in 
here". This is a joke where he is saying let's seal if off and not worry about it, 
which is a view unlikely to be popular with the lunar module pilot, Fred Haise. He 
also states that he had "more confidence" in the command module and shows the 
customary association between the specific areas of the spacecraft to which he is 
assigned. In making these connections there is a sense that Jack, like Jim and 
Fred, did everything he could have done to counteract the impact of the bang. 
Therefore, Jack is able to protect against the possibility of a negative assessment 
by recounting the event in minute detail in a way that presents his action as 
associated with a distinct set of category-bound activities, that of the command 
pilot. [20]
As with the final moments of Jim's account of the incident, Jack closes his 
statement with by introducing Fred to a particular way of describing the events: 
"I'll let him tell what uh his observations where (.) as far the instruments and the 
other caution warning alarms". Again, this is not marked as an opportunity to 
check any of Jack's view on the event, more as an opportunity for Fred to give his 
unique view on the event. As with Jim's response, Jack also uses co-opt 
practices when closing his version of events. Fred is not simply invited to speak, 
but he is invited to speak to a highly specified version of their collective 
experience. [21]
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4.3 Epistemic authority
Fred: well uh .hhh well first of all due to my position being (.) a lot more familiar with 
the LM side of the house uh (.) my natural first impulse on feeling this er shudder (.) 
and er °explosion° was to er (.) make sure that the LM hatch (...) that was on the 
other main bus (.) and er (.) this induced a voltage on the other main bus (.) and er (.) 
that's where I got a little smarter and er (.) thought maybe I would look at the other 
Fuel Cells which I hadn't even considered us having had a problem (.) and I found 
Fuel Cell 1 also er (.) not outputting any amps (.) er (.) from this point on we were 
kinda under the hands of Houston and er (.) further troubleshooting looking at a few 
more dials down on another meter and a LAB to look at the regulated pressures and 
eventually we got to the point where ah Houston eh called up and uh asked to shut 
down Fuel Cell 3 (.) shut down the reactance valve (.) and uh (.) I asked for 
reconfirmation since when you do that it is sorta irreversible if you shut one of these 
down they can only be restarted from ground support equipment and uh (.) they 
assured me that they really meant it (.) so (.) uh so I went through with it and 
subsequently the same command was given for Fuel Cell 1 (.) about this point in time 
the cryopressure (.) the oxygen levels had gone in cryotank 2 and the pressure in 
cryotank 1 was steadily (.) slowly (.) steadily decreasing (.) it was obvious that it 
wasn't holding its own (.) and er (.) right about then it quite apparent to me it was just 
a matter of time until the command module was gonna be dead (.) we were gonna 
lose that fuel cell also (.) so I kinda lost interest in that position and headed for the LM 
(long pause) (laughs)
Extract 3. Fred 09:28 [22]
Extract 3 begins with Fred making a reference to his specific role on the 
spacecraft and his actions at the point of hearing the bang. Fred states that: "due 
to my position being (.) a lot more familiar with the LM side of the house uh (.) my 
natural first impulse on feeling this er shudder (.) and er °explosion° was to er (.) 
make sure that the LM hatch (...) that was on the other main bus (.) and er (.) this 
induced a voltage on the other main bus". This shows how he recollects his 
actions on hearing the bang as being interactionally tied to his role as Lunar 
Module pilot. Fred explains how he tried to test the voltage on the other main bus 
and how his actions related to the LM "side of the house". This shows an 
orientation to his reactions as being informed by the specific needs of his role as 
a LM pilot and connects with the same way that the other astronauts explained 
what they heard. This could be described as connecting with a collective sense of 
epistemic authority. [23]
HERITAGE and RAYMOND (2005) note that epistemic authority concerns "the 
management of rights and responsibilities related to knowledge and information" 
(p.16). These epistemological concerns involve not simply implicit or explicit 
claims regarding any one speaker's rights to speak authoritatively on a given 
matter, but also, and crucially, the interactional management of the relative rights 
of different speakers to speak with authority on a matter. Thus, for HERITAGE 
and RAYMOND, speakers might not only seek to build their epistemic credentials 
for a given matter on which they talk but may also find ways of attending to 
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competing and unequal claims to knowledge (see also ENOKSEN & 
DICKERSON, 2018; RIAZ et al., 2016). In the above extract Fred articulates the 
distinct sphere of his epistemic authority as being with the "LM side of the house". 
This not only positions him as having expertise with that part of the spacecraft but 
also usefully emphasises the segmentation already present in the order in which 
the three astronauts speak. Fred's initial talk therefore could be seen as 
orientating to potential issues with a competitive knowledge claim by 
circumscribing his authority as related to the LM rather than the spacecraft, or 
mission, as a whole. [24]
Subsequently Fred does engage in talk that could be seen as addressing his own 
distinct claim to speak on these matters, detailing as it does the immediate 
awareness that he had of the situation. For example, Fred does not use the 
expression "the bang" to describe the incident and instead defines the incident as 
a "shudder" and "explosion". Fred also describes his experience of looking for 
any signs of voltage on the other LM and here he describes how he "got a little 
smarter" in relation to the amps in the different fuel cells. This constructs a 
position where he connects with the localised expertise, while also at the same 
time demonstrating an awareness of the situation that is distinct from the other 
two astronauts. Fred does not talk about the mission or the spacecraft in general 
terms (which would go against Jim and the group epistemic authority) but is still 
able to perform his connection to the group by specifically talking about the Lunar 
Module. This allows Fred to commit to the performance of a collective authority 
while at the same time showing his own specific knowledge on the subject. [25]
A further example of this ability to demonstrate an individual sense of authority is 
to upgrade the rights of the first speaker. For example, Fred upgrades his 
description of what happened through his commentary of the decision to shut 
down Fuel Cell 3 (a specific topic also discussed by Jack). Fred describes that it 
is "sorta irreversible if you shut one of these down". In stating this fact he is able 
to ramp-up the sense of his individual conceptualisation of the danger due to his 
further knowledge on the problem. This shows how Fred builds in his own form of 
epistemic authority that does not serve as a challenge to the earlier speaker. [26]
5. Discussion
Traditionally, given an event of this kind, social psychology would explore the way 
that each of the astronauts could account for their actions in terms of a causal 
attribution of the unexpected events (e.g., which could include either a "personal" 
or a "situational" explanation). This would conceptualise the response to their 
actions upon hearing the bang as a cognitive function, one that uses the 
information available in order to provide an explanation of the reactions to the 
event. Alternatively, in this article we have focussed on the interactional 
significance of the act of re-telling the events surrounding the explosion. This has 
looked to explore the way that facts of what happened have been collectively 
organised and communicated. [27]
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In our analysis, we identified three main themes in terms of the astronauts' 
recollections of witnessing the explosion: 1. how the discussion of their location 
on the spacecraft served as a way of communicating the unanticipated nature of 
the bang and reified their actions leading up to the incident; 2. how the subtle 
organisation of the recollections of their initial reactions structured the way the 
event was to be remembered by a wider audience; and 3. how each astronaut 
tried to construct their own sense of epistemic authority while still maintaining 
their connection to the accounts as performed by the other astronauts. [28]
In examining the discursive aspects of unexpected events, we can recognise how 
subtle practices in talk are committed to the performance of a collective memory 
of the event, in which speakers are able to speak to responsibility and 
accountability. Each of the extracts showed an attempt to co-op to the next 
speaker into delivering a particular aspect of the events. In doing so, this situated 
the following speaker as tied to that particular activity (such as "the warning 
alarms") and as responsible to continue the narrative in a similar direction. The 
prevalence of an epistemic authority represent those moments where an 
individual is able to pursue an individual aspect of the experience while keeping 
within the confines of the collective narrative. The findings could be applied to 
other "national disasters" or other unanticipated events and provide a way of 
critically examining the collective process through which these occurrences 
become "known" and "remembered". This avoids individualistic interpretations as 
is popular in social cognitive psychology and focusses on the join production of 
the memory of an event. [29]
In conclusion, we can see that the past was very much alive in the moments 
around re-telling these events and that the astronauts were careful to produce 
their version of the events in order to resist any claims of blame or responsibility. 
This research was shown to match other ways of producing factuality in everyday 
accounts and issues involving the collective construction of certain "truths" 
(CHILDS & MURRAY, 2010). Future research should look for evidence of how 
other unexpected events are recalled and remembered. [30]
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Appendix 
The transcription system is standard for discursive analysis and other 
interactional studies. The symbols are as follows (full details on these symbols 
can be found in JEFFERSON, 2004):
[] Square brackets mark the start and end of 
overlapping speech
↑↓ Vertical arrows precede marked pitch 
movement
Underlining1 Signals speaker's emphasis
CAPITALS Marks speech that is obviously louder than 
surrounding speech
°I know it° Degree signs enclose obviously quieter 
speech
(.8) Numbers in round brackets measure 
pauses longer than 0.2 seconds
(.) A pause of 0.2 seconds or less
((text)) additional comments from the transcriber
::: colons show degree of elongation of the 
prior sound; the more colons, the more 
elongation
hhh Aspiration (out-breaths)
hhh Inspiration (in-breaths)
Ye:ah, commas mark weak rising of "continuing" 
intonation
Ye:ah. Full stop marks falling or "completing" 
intonation
? Question mark signals questioning 
intonation, irrespective of grammar
>< less than and greater than symbols enclose 
speech that is noticeably quicker than the 
surrounding talk
= Equals signs mark the latching of one 
element of the talk to another. 
1 In FQS italics.
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